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THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN
WASHINGTON: EXTENDING THE PRIVILEGE TO
COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH CLINICS
Most jurisdictions provide some form of evidentiary privilege for com-
munications between psychotherapists and their patients. ' Under the priv-
ilege, psychotherapists may refuse to testify, or may, be prevented from
testifying, about communications made to them by their patients. While
many professional groups provide psychotherapeutic care, the number of
groups that receive state protection for confidential communications var-
ies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 2 Washington has traditionally
recognized the benefits of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, but has
limited its coverage to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists. 3 This lim-
itation works a hardship on the poor, who often can obtain help only from
government-sponsored institutions, which have few, if any, psychiatrists
or licensed psychologists on their staffs . 4
This Comment examines recent amendments to Washington's Commu-
nity Mental Health Services Act,5 which arguably extend the privilege to
communications made between patients and employees of state mental
health clinics and agencies. After reviewing the justifications for the psy-
1. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. For the purpose of this Comment, the term
"psychotherapist-patient privilege" includes the psychiatrist-patient privilege, psychologist-patient
privilege and any other privileges that protect communications made in a psychotherapeutic relation-
ship. This Comment also uses the term "patient" to describe persons who receive psychotherapeutic
care, even though many statutes use the term "client." See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 18.83.110
(1981), infra note 44.
2. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text. Indeed, simply defining the term psychotherapy
presents a difficult task. There are at least 40 definitions found in scientific literature. OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CosT-EFFECrivENmSS ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL TECH-
NOLOGY. BACKGROUND PAPER 3: THE EFFICACY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 9 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as COST EFFECTvENESS]. This Comment defines psychotherapy as "the treatment
of emotional and personality problems and disorders by psychological means." Id.
3. See infra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. The legislature has also extended the privilege
to communications made by persons seeking help for drug or alcohol abuse at authorized agencies.
WASH. REV. CODE § 69.54.070 (1981).
Psychiatrists are medical school graduates who have had a two- to three-year residency in psychia-
try at an approved institution. Psychologists generally hold a doctoral degree (either a Ph.D. or a
Psy.D.), and have had a one-year internship in a setting approved by the American Psychological
Association. See COST EFFECnvENESS, supra note 2, at 15-16.
4. See-infra note 87. Limiting the privilege to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists has been
referred to as creating an invidious discrimination against people who cannot afford to get help from
other than a government-sponsored institution. State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1979)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In GoOfrey, the court narrowly construed a
psychologist-patient privilege statute so that it did not extend to persons acting as agents for, or under
the direction of, licensed psychologists. Id. at 1328.
5. Ch. 204, 1982 Wash. Laws 777 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.24 (Supp. 1982)).
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chotherapist-patient privilege, part I of this Comment discusses the pre-
sent structure of the privilege in Washington. Part II considers the amend-
ments to the Community Mental Health Services Act and concludes that
these amendments are beneficial because they extend the availability of
confidential mental health treatment to the poor without greatly limiting
the amount of admissible evidence. Last, this Comment proposes a com-
prehensive psychotherapist-patient privilege statute to provide uniformity
for the psychotherapist-patient privilege in this state.
I. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Background
Privileged communications are an exception to the general rule that all
persons, when called upon to testify, must present all relevant facts in-
quired into in a court of law. 6 The use of a privilege allows a witness to
withhold testimony that would otherwise be relevant. Because privileges
tend to impede the search for truth in the courtroom, they are granted
sparingly by the legislatures and the courts. Nonetheless, communica-
tions in certain relationships are granted privileged status. It is generally
6. 8 J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 2285 (1961). Wigmore further states:
For more than three centuries it has now been recognized as a fundamental maxim that the
public ... has a right to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of
exemption, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give what testi-
mony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions which may exist are distinctly excep-
tional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule ....
.. . The vital process of justice must continue unceasingly. A single cessation typifies the
prostration of society. A series would involve its dissolution. The pettiness and personality of
the individual trial disappear when we reflect that our duty to bear testimony runs not to the
parties in that present cause, but to the community at large and forever.
It follows, on the one hand, that all privileges of exemption from this duty are exceptional,
and are therefore to be discountenanced. There must be good reason, plainly shown, for their
existence.
Id. § 2192, at 70-73.
The word privilege comes from the Latin words privata lex, a prerogative given to a person or a
group of persons. A privilege was originally conveived of in England as a judicially recognized point
of honor among lawyers. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 413 (Alaska 1976); see also Slovenko,
Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 181 (1960). Only the
attomey-client privilege was allowed under early common law. J. WIGMORE. supra, § 2290; see also
Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychologist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 384, 385 (1952). A physician, for example, could not refuse to testify under the original, com-
mon law view. 8 J. WIGMORE. supra, § 2380. Many other privileges have since been recognized by
statute or judicial decision. In Washington, see, for example, WASH. REV. CODE § 18.53.200 (1981)
(optometrist-patient privilege), id. § 5.60.060(1) (1981) (husband and wife privilege), and id. §
5.60.060(3) (1981) (priest-penitent privilege).
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recognized that four fundamental conditions are necessary to establish an
evidentiary privilege. 7 These conditions are:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satis-
factory maintainence of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater.than the benefit thereby gained for the cor-
rect disposal of litigation. 8
When these four conditions are present, a privilege should be recog-
nized. A few commonly recognized examples of privileges that meet
these four conditions are the attorney-client privilege, the husband-wife
privilege, and the privilege protecting communications among jurors. 9
Statutory privileges have been enacted even when these four funda-
mental conditions are not met. The most common example is the physi-
cian-patient privilege. Despite broad acceptance by many state legisla-
tures, 10 the physician-patient privilege has been frequently attacked as an
unjustified frustration of the search for truth. I I Due in large part to com-
7. 8 J. WIGMORE. supra note 6, § 2285. These four conditions have been accepted as fundamen-
tal to the establishment of a privilege in the State of Washington. See State ex rel. Haugland v.
Smythe, 25 Wn. 2d 161, 168, 169 P.2d 706, 710 (1946). These criteria, however, have been criti-
cized for allowing too many privileges. See Comment, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and
Other Professionals: Its Implications For the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE L.J.
1226, 1230(1962).
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis omitted).
9. Id. at 528.
10. A New York statute, enacted in 1828, was the first statute to protect communications be-
tween a physician and a patient. 2 N.Y. REV. STATS. pt. III, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 73 (1829), reprinted
in Louisell & Sinclair, Reflections on the Law of Privileged Communications-The Psychotherapist-
Patient Privilege in Perspective, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 30, 32 n.9 (1971). Today, over two-thirds of the
states have adopted similar statutes. See infra notes 58-62.
11. For example, Professor McCormick states:
The arguments of policy against the recognition of [the physician-patient privilege] seem
overwhelming. The improvement of treatment by encouraging free disclosure seems an unrealis-
tic justification. The patient has ample motive for full disclosure without the privilege and in
most cases will not be thinking, when he considers what he will tell his doctor, about what may
happen in the courtroom. As for the interest of privacy, usually the patient has opened up to the
public, by pleadings and testimony, the issue of his condition long before the doctor is called
upon to disclose his knowledge.
McCormick, Some Highlights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 Tx. L. REv. 559, 570 (1955). See
generally 8 J. WIOMORE. supra note 6 § 2380(a) (criticizing the physician-patient privilege). Wig-
more has stated that the physician-patient privilege meets but one of his four conditions-that the
relationship should be fostered by society. Id. at 829-30. He further argues that the "real support for
the privilege seems to be mainly the weight of professional medical opinion pressing upon the legisla-
ture." Id. at 831.
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mentators' attacks on the validity of the privilege, these statutes have of-
ten been narrowly construed, 12 and contain many exceptions. 13 Although
the psychotherapist-patient privilege is an outgrowth of the physician-pa-
tient privilege, 14 there are greater justifications for confidentiality in the
psychotherapist-patient relationship.
B. The Justification for the Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
In recent years, several proposed privileges have been rejected 15 and
other long-established privileges have been contracted. 16 Despite this
trend, legal commentators have almost uniformly supported the adoption
of some form of psychotherapist-patient privilege.1 7 The privilege also
appears to have growing support in the courts and in state legislatures. ' 8
12. In Washington, see, for example, Department of Social and Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wn.
2d 812, 819-20, 601 P.2d 520, 525 (1979) (physician-patient privilege is not applicable to Depart-
ment of Social and Health Services' audit of medical records of Medicaid recipients) and Randa v.
Bear, 50 Wn. 2d 415, 420, 312 P.2d 640, 645 (1957) (patient waived privilege by filing a cross-
complaint).
13. See FED R. EVID, 504 (Proposed 1972) advisory committee note, reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183,
242 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rule 504], where the committee listed the following com-
mon exceptions:
[C]ommunications not made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment; commitment and restora-
tion proceedings; issues as to will or otherwise between parties claiming by succession from the
patient; actions on insurance policies; required reports (venereal diseases, gunshot wounds,
child abuse); communications in furtherance of crime or fraud; mental or physical condition put
in issue by patient (personal injury cases); malpractice actions; and some or all criminal prosecu-
tions.
At least three of these exceptions exist in Washington: child abuse, patient-litigant, and involun-
tary civil commitment. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. The privilege does, however,
apply in criminal prosecutions in Washington. See infra note 44.
14. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., United States v. Schoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting employer-
stenographer privilege); In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1976)
(rejecting required reports privilege); Lewis v. Capital Mortgage Invs., 78 F.R.D. 295 (D. Md.
1978) (rejecting accountant-client privilege); State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wn. 2d 161,
169-70, 169 P.2d 706, 711 (1946) (rejecting a welfare records privilege in Washington).
16. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980) (restricting the privilege for com-
munications between husband and wife); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.) (con-
versations between husband and wife about crimes in which they have participated do not fall within
the scope of privileged marital communications), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978).
17. See, e.g., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99, at 213 n.9 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972); Dubey, Confidentiality as a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical Necessitiesfor Abso-
lute Privilege in Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974); Goldstein & Katz, Psychya-
trist-Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36 CONN. B.J. 175, 178-79
(1962); Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World: Part 11, 41 MINN. L. REv. 731, 740-45
(1957); Comment, Underprivileged Communications: Extension of the Psychotherapist-Patient Priv-
ilege to Patients of Psychiatric Social Workers, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1050 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Underprivileged Communications]; Comment, The Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege in Illinois, 10 LoY
U. CHI. L.J. 525,528-29 (1979).
18. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
Although the privilege is generally created by statute, it has also been
fashioned by common law, 19 and under the Constitution. 20 Support for
the privilege is well founded because the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship fulfills Wigmore's four conditions.
First, communications between a patient and a psychotherapist are, by
their very nature, confidential. Patients often reveal thoughts to psychoth-
erapists that they have revealed to no one else:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the
world. He exposes to the therapist not only what his words directly express;
he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his
shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy know that this is what
will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on that condi-
tion.21
Patients who have expressed such hidden thoughts and desires generally
expect that such information will be kept confidential. 22
The presence of the second condition, that confidentiality be essential
to the relationship, is' the subject of more debate. Some commentators
have argued that because the practices of psychology and psychiatry have
flourished in locations where the privilege does not exist, the privilege is
not essential for an effective therapeutic relationship. 23 Despite this fact,
numerous authorities maintain that confidentiality is essential to the main-
tenance of the psychotherapist-patient'relationship. 24 Unless patients are
19. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976). For a detailed discussion of the
Allred case, see infra note 63; Binder v. Ruvell, Civ. Docket No. 52C2535 (Cir. Ct.,Cooke Co. Ill.
1952) (plaintiff was not allowed to question his wife's psychiatrist concerning information she had
revealed in psychiatric consultations), cited in 150 J. A.M.A. 1241 (1952). This case is commented
on in Note, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New Testimonial Privilege, 47
Nw. U.L. REv. 384 (1952).
20. See infra notes 33 & 35.
21. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (citing M. GUTTMACHER & H.
WEIHOFEN. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 272 (1952)). The language in Taylor has been cited in support
of the psychiatrist-patient privilege in Washington. State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 225, 373 P.2d
474,480(1962).
22. See Meyer & Smith, A Crisis in Group Therapy, 32 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 638, 639-40 (1977).
23. See Note, Untangling Tarasoff, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 29 HAsT-
tNOS L.J. 179, 197 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Untangling Tarasoff]. See also In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 426, 467 P.2d 557, 564, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 836 (1970), a leading case in support of the
constitutional basis for the privilege, where the California Supreme Court stated: "[We cannot blind
ourselves to the fact that the practice of psychotherapy has grown, indeed flourished, in an environ-
ment of non-absolute privilege."
24. See, e.g., Proposed Rule 504, supra note 13, at 242 (quoting Group For the Advancement of
Psychiatry, Report No. 45 92 (1960)):
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capac-
ity to help his patients is completely dependent on their willingness and ability to talk freely.
This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to assure his
patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. Where there may be excep-
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assured that information they relate to their psychotherapist will remain
confidential, they may become reluctant to communicate all their
thoughts. This silence defeats the purpose of psychotherapeutic treat-
ment. Treatment would be ineffectual if patients "knew that all they
say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say-may be re-
vealed to the world on the witness stand.''25 Without the assurance of
confidentiality, patients might refuse treatment or be substantially less in-
clined to obtain treatment. 26
In accord with Wigmore's third condition, the psychotherapist-patient
relationship is one that society fosters. Society's recognition of the need
for psychotherapists and the benefits they provide is evidenced by the bil-
lions of dollars spent annually in both the public and private sectors on
mental health care. 27 Psychotherapeutic treatment has the potential to pre-
vent or reduce antisocial behavior, thereby reducing criminal acts. 28 As
the California Supreme Court has noted: "The swiftness of change-eco-
nomic, cultural, and moral-produces accelerated tension in our society,
and the potential for relief of such emotional disturbances offered by psy-
chotherapy undoubtedly establishes it as a profession essential to the pres-
ervation of societal health and well being." 2 9 Because psychotherapy has
the potential for curing many social and psychological ills before they are
tions to this general rule . . . there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for
successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be likened to that of the priest-peni-
tent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore the very depths of their patients' con-
scious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessi-
tates going beyond a patient's awareriess and, in order to do this, it must be possible to
communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.
25. Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting M. GUrTMACHER & H.
WEIHOFER. PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952)).
26. Project, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Ef-
fects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 183 (1978); see Meyer & Smith, supra note 22, at 638-40;
Untangling Tarasoff, supra note 23, at 194-95 (quoting CAL EVID. CODE § 1014 comment of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary (West 1966)).
27. See Comment, The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege: Are Some Patients More Privileged
Than Others? 10 PAC. L.J. 801, 802 (1979) [hereinafter cited as More Privileged], where the author
states: "Mental health care is no longer an infrequent occurrence in American society. In quest of
mental health, billions of dollars are spent annually and millions of persons are affected either di-
rectly or indirectly." In Washington, the state's Mental Health Program (DSHS) proposed a budget
of $97,117,000 for 1979-81, a 19.1% increase over the prior term. Department of Social and Health
Services, Governor's Operating Budget, Human Resources, Mental Health Program 418 (1981)
(copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
28. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 429 (Alaska 1976), (Dimond, J., concurring). See also
Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH L. REv. 1, 39 (1980), where the
author argues:
The societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of therapy is to promote emotional and
mental health, which ultimately will reduce antisocial activity and other societal burdens that
result from untreated or poorly treated mental problems. Successful psychotherapy may reduce
social problems such as juvenile delinquency, marital complications, and violent crime.




manifested in the form of delinquent social acts, the privilege should be
and is "sedulously fostered" by our society.
The fourth condition involves a balancing between the need for truth in
the courtroom 30 and the need for confidentiality in certain relationships. It
is necessary to decide whether the interests of society will best be served
if psychotherapists can ensure their clients of confidentiality, or if they
are instead required to testify about confidential communications with
their clients. Because the use of the privilege encourages people to seek
psychotherapeutic treatment, and that treatment may prevent crimes or
other social problems before they occur, the privilege should be fa-
vored. 31 Special exemptions and exceptions can be carved out for those
areas where the need for the testimony outweighs the benefit of confiden-
tiality. 32
Two additional arguments support the justification for the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege. First, forced disclosure of these communications
may violate the patient's constitutional right of privacy. 33 Some commen-
tators also argue that the failure to extend the privilege to the poor may
violate the equal protection clause. 34 The California Supreme Court was
the first court to recognize a constitutionally based psychotherapist-pa-
30. Chief Justice Burger's statement in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,709 (1974), is one
example of the judicial desire for truth in the courtroom:
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties con-
test all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary
system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated
if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of
all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is
imperative to the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of
evidence needed either by the prosecution or by the defense.
See also State v. Gotfrey, 598 P.2d 1325, 1327-28 (Utah 1979), where the court complained that
the creation of a psychologist-patient privilege closes "another window to the light of truth."
31. See Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 429 (Alaska 1976) (Dimond, J., concurring). Judge Di-
mond stated:
[The purpose of the psychotherapist-patient relationship is the prevention and curing of antiso-
cial behavior .... If this type of activity is successful, then many potential crimes will not be
committed. The prevention of a number of similar defendants being prosecuted in future cases is
more than an adequate balance for the hampering of the truth-finding function in an individual
case.
32. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (listing the Washington exceptions).
33. For an in depth analysis of the constitutional argument, see Smith, supra note 28; Note,
Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege or a Right?, 3 CONN. L. REv. 599 (1971).
The right of privacy limits government intrusion into important areas of people's lives. The Supreme
Court first recognized a specific right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
where in a divided opinion it struck down a statute which prohibited married couples from using
contraceptives. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Court used the constitutional right of
privacy to reverse the defendant's conviction for selling contraceptives to an unmarried person.
34. See Underprivileged Communications, supra note 17, at 1061-68; More Privileged, supra
note 27, at 815-18.
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tient privilege. It held that the confidentiality of the psychotherapeutic
session falls within one of the zones of privacy guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. 35 Even though the Washington Supreme Court has not endorsed
this position, 36 the proximity of these communications to constitutional
zones of privacy emphasizes the need for the privilege.
Second, the psychotherapist-patient privilege prevents the courts from
forcing psychotherapists into a "cruel trilemma." 37 Under the "cruel tri-
lemma," psychotherapists are obligated to choose among one of three
undesirable results: (1) to violate the extraordinary trust imposed upon
them by their clients and profession; 38 (2) to lie, and thereby commit per-
jury; or (3) to refuse to testify and thereby be held in contempt of court.
Due to the "cruel trilemma," psychotherapists have been known to fabri-
cate, to have "memory lapses" on the witness stand, or to keep two sets
of records. 39 Rather than requiring the psychotherapist to resolve these
conflicting demands, a court or a state legislature may prefer to grant the
privilege. 40
C. The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege in Washington
1. Present Statutory Structure
In Washington, two groups of psychotherapists, psychiatrists and li-
censed psychologists, have statutory privileges for communications made
to them by a patient. A third group of professionals, the employees in the
state's mental health services clinics, arguably have a privilege created by
recent amendments to the Community Mental Health Services Act. 4 1 This
possibility is discussed in detail in part II.
Because psychiatrists are medical doctors, they have traditionally come
35. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431-32, 467 P.2d 557, 567, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 839 (1970).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also recognized a constitutionally based psychotherapist-pa-
tient privilege. In re B., 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419,425 (1978).
36. See generally State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d 730, 735, 539 P.2d 86, 89 (1975). The Washing-
ton court has specifically rejected a constitutional privilege for physicians and their patients. Depart-
ment of Social and Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wn. 2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520, 525 (1979).
37. The term "cruel trilemma" was coined by Professor Robert Aronson, Professor of Evidence
at the University of Washington. While courts have not used the specific terminology of Aronson's
cruel trilemma, but see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (using the term in the
context of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination), they may refer to this general
principle when establishing or denying a privilege. See, e.g., Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 418
(Alaska 1976) (adopting a psychotherapist-patient privilege at common law).
38. Smith, supra note 28, at 30.
39. Underprivileged Communications, supra note 17, at 1054.
40. See, e.g.. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,418 (Alaska 1976).
41. Ch. 204, 1982 Wash. Laws 848 (codified at WASH REV CODE ch. 71.24 (Supp. 1982)).
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within the physician-patient privilege.42 The purpose of the physician-pa-
tient privilege is to encourage patients to disclose their ailments to a phy-
sician in order to receive proper treatment. 43 In Washington, unlike some
jurisdictions, the physician-patient privilege applies to criminal as well as
civil proceedings. 44 Licensed psychologists are privileged under a sepa-
rate statute. 45 Under the latter statute, communications between a psy-
chologist and a patient are privileged to the same extent as communica-
tions between an attorney and a client. 46 Nonetheless, in some
circumstances, such as child abuse, the court has construed the psycholo-
gist-client privilege to be less extensive than the attorney-client privi-
lege. 47 The Washington Supreme Court has expressed some perplexity
over the use of the attorney-client privilege to define the psychologist-
client privilege: "It is puzzling that the statute relates the psychologist-
client relationship to that of attorney and client, rather than that of physi-
cian and patient, which would appear to have. a more logical relation.' 48
The use of separate privileges for psychiatrists and psychologists has been
criticized because it can lead to anomalous results. 49
42. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (1981) provides:
A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a
civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient, which was necessary to
enable him to prescribe or act for the patient, but this exception shall not apply in any judicial
proceeding regarding a child's injuries, neglect or sexual abuse, or the cause thereof.
In State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 226, 373 P.2d 474, 481 (1962), the court held that statements
by a patient to a psychiatrist were privileged under the physician-patient privilege.
43. State v. Fackrell, 44 Wn. 2d 874, 877, 271 P.2d 679, 681 (1954).
44. State v. Sullivan, 60 Wn. 2d 214, 223, 373 P.2d 474, 479 (1962). The extension of the
privilege to criminal proceedings is based on three statutes: WASH. REv. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (1981),
supra note 42; id. § 10.52.020 which provides: "Witnesses competent to testify in civil cases shall be
competent in criminal prosecutions, but regular physicians or surgeons, clergymen or priests, shall be
protected from testifying as to confessions, or information received from any defendant, by virtue of
their profession and character .... "; and id. § 10.58.010 which provides: "The rules of evidence in
civil actions, so far as practicable, shall be applied to criminal prosecutions."
45. WASH. REv. CODE § 18.83.110 (1981) provides: "Confidential communications between a
client and a psychologist shall be privileged against compulsory disclosure to the same extent and
subject to the same conditions as confidential communications between attorney and client."
The attorney-client privilege, codified at id. § 5.60.060(2), provides: "An attorney or counselor
shall not, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional employment."
For articles discussing the difficulties inherent in comparing the psychotherapist-patient privilege
to the attorney-client privilege, see infra note 49.
46. WASH REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (1981).
47.' State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d 730, 733 n. 1, 539 P.2d 86, 88 n. 1(1975). See infra notes 50 &
74 and accompanying text.
48. State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d 730,733 n.1,539 P.2d 86, 88 n. 1(1975).
49. See infra notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text. See also Louisell, The Psychologist in
Today's Legal World: Part 11, 41 MINN. L. REV. 731 (1957); Comment, Evidence: Justification for
Extension of the Psychotherapist Privilege, 17 WASHBuRN L.J. 672, 677-78 (1978).
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Both privileges are strictly construed because the Washington courts
regard these statutes as procedural safeguards which are "in derogation of
common law." 50 Each privilege is subject to at least three exceptions.
First, both privileges include exceptions for the reporting of child
abuse. 5' Second, the privilege does not apply in certain involuntary civil
commitment proceedings. 52 Third, the privileges are waived if the patient
calls on the psychotherapist to testify, or puts his psychological state at
issue in a trial. 53 This third exception is commonly referred to as the pa-
tient-litigant exception.
2. The Need for a More Equitable Privilege
By restricting the privilege to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists,
Washington has failed to provide the poor with access to confidentiality in
psychotherapy. One commentator has argued that the privilege should not
be limited to psychiatrists and psychologists, but should be extended fur-
ther to psychiatric social workers or social workers generally. 54 Patients
visit these professionals for the same reason that others visit psychiatrists
and licensed psychologists. 55 Because money may be the only determina-
tive factor in choosing one type of therapist over another, providing the
privilege solely to patients who are able to afford higher-paid profession-
als discriminates against the poor. On the other hand, since invoking the
privilege precludes the admission of relevant evidence, courts are justifi-
ably concerned with restricting.the number of groups protected by the
privilege. 56 Once the privilege has been extended to one group, such as
50. Department of Social and Health Servs. v. Latta, 92 Wn. 2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520, 525
(1979); see also In re Henderson, 29 Wn. App. 748,752-53, 630 P.2d 944, 947 (1981).
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.44.020, .030, .060 (1981). In State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d 730, 539
P.2d 86 (1975), the court found that the psychotherapist-patient privilege was overridden by the
Washington statute protecting children from abuse. Id. at 735, 539 P.2d at 90. WASH. REV. CODE §
26.44.030 (1981) provides in part:
When any practitioner, professional school personnel, registered or licensed nurse, social
worker, psychologist, pharmacist, or employee of the department of social and health services
has reasonable cause to believe that a child or adult developmentally disabled person has suf-
fered abuse or neglect, he shall report such incident, or cause a report to be made, to the proper
law enforcement agency or to the department of social and health services.
52. WASH. REV CODE § 71.05.250 (1981).
53. See State v. Tradewell, 9 Wn. App. 821, 515 P.2d 172 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 985
(1974).
54. See, e.g., Underprivileged Communications, supra note 17.
55. Id. at 1052.
56. This concern applies to all privileges. The Washington courts, for example, do not favor
privileges:
It is an inherent power of a court of justice, within the sphere of its jurisdiction, to compel
witnesses to appear before it and testify concerning any relevant facts within their knowledge, in
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psychiatric social workers, the failure to extend it to all groups ostensibly
providing psychotherapeutic care may be difficult to justify. However,
extending the privilege to the many groups that arguably perform coun-
seling or psychotherapeutic functions57 would bar so much relevant evi-
dence that it would make a mockery of many judicial proceedings.
While many states have adopted some type of psychotherapist-patient
testimonial privilege, the statutes vary in form. Likewise the court deci-
sions have differed in determining the extent of the psychotherapeutic re-
lationship covered. Most jurisdictions, including Washington, have a
physician-patient privilege, which covers communications made to psy-
chiatrists. 58 Recognizing that many of the objections to the physician-
patient privilege do not apply to psychiatrists, several jurisdictions
adopted a special privilege for this profession. 59 Many states extended the
privilege further to licensed psychologists, since they perform much the
same function as psychiatrists, but are not protected under the physician-
patient privilege. 60 In order to provide uniformity for the privilege in a
a case then pending in that court. Without such power, courts would cease to function and
causes presented to them could not be conducted....
For several centuries it has been recognized as a fundamental maxim that it is the general duty
of every man to give what testimony he is capable of giving. Any exemptions from that positive
general rule are distinctly exceptional.
State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wn. 2d 161, 167-68, 169 P.2d 706, 710 (1946).
57. A list of persons who perform psychotherapeutic services would include psychiatrists, clini-
cal psychologists, nonpsychiatric physicians, social workers, psychiatric social workers, school psy-
chologists, marriage, family and child counselors, pastoral counselors, educational psychologists,
occupational therapists, and some paraprofessionals. For a discussion of the background and services
performed by some of these groups, see Cost Effectiveness, supra note 2, at 14-16.
Arguably, the list could be extended even further to include self-appointed therapists, faith healers,
members of the police department, bartenders, or even hairdressers. See Slovenko, Psychotherapist-
Patient Testimonial Privilege: A Picture of Misguided Hope, 23 CATH. U.L. REv. 649, 664-65 n.29
(1974); Smith, Constitutional Privacy in Psychotherapy, supra note 28, at 49 n.271.
58. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062(4) (1978); CAL. EVID. CODE §8 990-1007 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (Supp. 1976); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-307 (1981); IDAHO
CODE § 9-203(4) (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 51, § 5.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE §
34-1-14-5 (Supp. 1982); IowA CODE § 622.10 (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-427 (1976); Ky.
REV. STAT. § 213.200 (1982); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:476 (1981); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 27A.2157
(1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(4) (West. Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-21 (Supp.
1982); Mo. REV. STAT. § 491.060(5) (Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-805 (1981); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 329:26 (Supp. 1981); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:84A-22.2 (1976); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW §
4504 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02(B)
(Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.235 (1981); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4495b, § 5.08 (Vernon
Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8(4) (1977) and UTAH R. EvID. 27; VA. CODE § 8.01-399
(1977)); WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4) (1981); Wyo. STAT. § 1-12-101 (1977).
59. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146d (Supp. 1982); GA. CODE § 38-418(5) (1981); Ky. REV. STAT. §
421.215 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-207 (1980).
60. ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (Supp. 1982); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-1516 (1979); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-43-120 (Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c (Supp. 1982); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-1704.16 (1981); GA. CODE § 84-3118 (1979); IDAHO CODE § 54-2314 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
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psychotherapeutic setting, some states have adopted a "psychotherapeu-
tic patient" privilege. 61 Still other states have a single rule covering com-
munications to physicians, psychiatrists and psychologists. 62 While many
jurisdictions have accepted the view that the privilege should be granted
to psychiatrists and licensed psychologists, extension of the privilege be-
yond that point remains an intensely debated issue. 63
The variety of state statutes and judicial resolutions are an outgrowth of
the search for an equitable solution that reconciles the desire of the courts
to hear relevant evidence, with the goal of providing poor patients with
the opportunity to receive confidential psychotherapeutic treatment.
Some authorities have proposed a functional approach, arguing that
"there is little justification for extending privileged status to one group
and denying it to another that is functionally accomplishing the same
thing.''64 This approach would establish the privilege where the psy-
11, § 5306 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE § 25-33-1-17 (Supp. 1982); KAN STAT. ANN § 74-
5323 (1980); KY REv. STAT. § 319.111 (1982); LA. REV STAT. ANN. § 37:2366 (West 1974); MINN.
STAT. § 595.02(7) (Supp. (West 1974); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(7) (Supp. 1983); Miss. CODE ANN. 73-
31-29 (1973); Mo. REV. STAT § 337.055 (Supp. 1983); MONT CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (1981); N.H.
REV STAT. ANN. § 330-A:19 (Supp. 1981); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 4507 (McKinney Supp. 1982);
N.C. GEN. STAT § 8-53.3 (1981); OHIO REV CODE ANN § 4732.19 (Page Supp. 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN § 63-11-213 (1982): VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (Supp. 1982); WASH. REV CODE § 18.83.110
(1981); WYO STAT § 33-27-103 (1977).
61. ALA CODE § 34-26-2 (Supp. 1982); CAL. EVID CODE §§ 1010-1026 (West 1966 & Supp.
1983); FLA STAT § 90.503 (1979); MD CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (1980 & Supp. 1982):
N.M.R. EvID 504; TEX, REV CIV STAT. ANN. art. 5561h, §§ 1-6 (Vernon Supp. 1982).
62. DEL. R. EvID 503; HAWAII R. EViD. 504 & 504.1; LA REV. STAT ANN § 13.3734 (Supp.
1983); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (1974 & Supp. 1983); NEv REV. STAT. §§
49.215-.245 (1977); N.D.R. EvID. 503; OKLA. STAr. tit. 12, § 2503 (Supp. 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 5-37.3-1 to 5-37.3-11 (Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 19-13-6 to 19-13-11 (1979 &
Supp. 1982); WIS. STAT § 905.04 (Supp. 1982).
63. An excellent example of this conflict is Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976). The
court divided in determining the scope of the privilege. In Allred, the defendant was arrested for
shooting and killing a friend in a hotel room. While at the police station, Allred spoke with his drug
counselor, employed at a local psychiatric clinic. Allred admitted to the counselor that he killed the
victim, but stated that he had done so at the victim's request. The testimony of the counselor concern-
ing this conversation was admitted in court. The Supreme Court of Alaska, after establishing the
existence of a common law psychotherapist-patient privilege, split on whether it should be extended
to Allred's counselor. Two judges determined that the privilege should cover the communications
with the counselor because Allred sought her aid in resolving mental and emotional problems, and
because the relationship between the counselor and Allred fulfilled Wigmore's four canons. Id. at
425-26. Two judges would not have applied the privilege in Allred's case because the counselor was
neither a psychiatrist nor a licensed psychologist. They preferred to keep the privilege within strict
boundaries, applying it solely to two professional groups, and only for psychotherapeutic treatment,
not counseling. Id. at 421-22. The fifth judge believed that an Alaska statute, which prevented psy-
chologists from revealing "to another person a communications made to him by a client," created a
psychotherapist's testimonial privilege, and that it was not necessary to find a common law basis for
the privilege. Id. at 422.
64. Slovenko, supra note 57, at 664; see Underprivileged Communications, supra note 17, at




chotherapeutic function is the foundation of the relationship, and would
protect those who, in the course of their employment, practice psychoth-
erapy. 65 A functional approach would provide the poor with greater ac-
cess to confidential communications by increasing the number of groups
covered under the privilege. The approach would do little, however, to
address the problem of excluding large amounts of relevant testimony. 66
A more adequate solution must address both issues. To this end, a state
should delineate the number of groups protected by the privilege, and
guarantee that at least one of these groups provides psychotherapeutic
care to the poor. With the recent amendments to the Community Mental
Health Services Act,67 the state of Washington appears to have adopted
just such a compromise solution.
H. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-
PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN WASHINGTON
A. The Mental Health Services Act
The Community Mental Health Services Act ("the Act") was first
adopted in Washington in 1967.68 The purpose of the Act was to give
financial assistance to counties in order to develop community mental
health programs. 69 The Act laid the foundation for the community mental
that one form of psychotherapy is more effective than another. See Slovenko, supra note 57, at
664-65.
65. See Underprivileged Communications, supra note 17, at 1058-60; Slovenko, supra note 57,
at 664; More Privileged, supra note 27, at 820.
66. If there is no restriction on the groups covered by the privilege, it could exclude large
amounts of evidence from the trier of fact. See Proposed Rule 504, supra note 13, at 243, where the
advisory committee, in support of its goal to limit the privilege, stated that the "requirement that the
psychologist be in fact licensed, and not merely be believed to be so, is believed to be justified by the
number of persons, other than psychiatrists, purporting to render psychotherapeutic aid and the vari-
ety of their theories."
A functional approach could prove unsatisfactory for a second reason. In order for the privilege to
be effective, patients must know, when entering into the relationship, that their communications will
remain confidential. It is this confidentiality that forms the basis of the trust in the relationship. Under
a functional test, the professional could not guarantee confidentiality for each session, as each session
would be open to a case-by-case examination so that a court could determine whether a particular
session was "psychotherapeutic." This result could enervate the trust that is essential to psychother-
apy.
67. Ch. 204, 1982 Wash. Laws 848 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE ch. 71.24 (Supp. 1982)).
68. Ch. lI 1t, 1967 Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1925 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.24 (1981)
(amended 1982)).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.010 (1981) (repealed 1982). The Act authorized the Secretary of
the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to make grants to counties to provide mental
health services. Id. § 71.24.030 (1981) (amended 1982). The Mental Health Division of DSHS di-
rects the mental health program in Washington. D. Kole, An Overview, Mental Health Division,
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health clinics by allowing counties to provide mental health services di-
rectly, or by contracting for such services with a nonprofit organization. 70
The original Community Mental Health Services Act made no explicit
guarantee of confidentiality for communications between clinic employ-
ees and patients. 71
In 1982, substantial amendments to the 1967 Act were proposed to pro-
vide a clear direction for the administration and delivery of mental health
service. 72 The overall goal of the new Act is to clarify, in law, the roles of
the state, the counties and the mental health services providers, and to
provide for greater accountability in the delivery of mental health services
provided by the state. 73 The most important amendment, for the purpose
of this Comment, is the provision guaranteeing the confidentiality of cli-
Department of Social and Health Services 2-4 (March 1980) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review).
70. WASH. REv CODE § 71.24.050 (1981) (repealed 1982).
71. The Washington Supreme Court, however, discussed a method for extending the psychother-
apist-patient privilege to clinic employees under the old Act in State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d 730, 539
P.2d 86 (1975). The defendant Fagalde was convicted of assaulting a minor child and appealed the
trial court's admission of the testimony of two mental health clinic employees concerning their con-
versations with the defendant. Fagalde contended that these communications were privileged by ref-
erences, subsequently deleted, in the confidentiality section of WASH. REV. CODE § 69.54.070, the
Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Act, to the old Community Mental Health Services Act. WASH.
REV. CODE § 69.54.070, in force at that time, provided in part: "When an individual submits himself
for care, treatment [or] counseling ... to any organization, [or] institution ... approved pursuant to
this chapter and [the Community Mental Health Services Act,] such individual is guaranteed confi-
dentiality." WASH REV. CODE § 69.54.070 (1981) (amended 1982).
Although the court ultimately resolved the issue on other grounds, see supra note 51, the court
indicated in dicta that it was amenable to the defendant's statutory interpretation:
The legislative scheme proposed by the [defendant] is not an irrational one. Certainly, the
legislature, in RCW 71.24 ... has manifested an intent that persons with emotional problems
... should seek and receive help. It would seem that the legislature would be reluctant to dis-
courage this by requiring disclosure of information given during counseling.
Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d at 735, 539 P.2d at 89-90.
The solution proposed in Fagalde is no longer available as all references to the Community Mental
Health Services Act have been delected from the Drug and Alcohol Rehabilitation Act. Ch. 193,
1982 Wash. Laws 805 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 69.54 (Supp. 1982)).
The court also identified a second possible method for extending the psychologist-patient privilege
based on the patient's reasonable belief that the psychologist was licensed. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d at
737, 539 P.2d at 91 (1975). The court left this issue open as well. Extending the privilege to all
persons reasonably believed to be licensed psychologists, as is done with attorneys, does little to
resolve the conflict discussed in this Comment. First, there would be no limit on the number of
groups to which the privilege could extend. Second, the standard does not adequately provide the
poor with access to confidential communications because they could use the privilege only so long as
they remained ignorant of their counselor's status. Once they discovered the counselor was not li-
censed, future communications could not be privileged. Third, this interpretation could lead to ano-
malous results concerning the privilege for psychiatrists and psychologists. See infra notes 100-101
and accompanying text.
72. SENATE COMM. ON SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, REPORT ON ESSB 4786 MODIFYING THE




ent information. 74 As a result of the Act and the 1982 amendments, com-
munity mental health services are available in all counties, provided by
approximately seventy-five public and private nonprofit agencies. 75 Ser-
vices include outpatient, inpatient and twenty-four hour emergency treat-
ment, as well as consultation, education and community support ser-
vices. 76 These community mental health clinics, staffed by over 1700
employees, 77 provided services to approximately 68,000 clients in
1979.78
B. Extending the Testimonial Privilege to Employees of the Mental
Health Services Clinics
The new Community Mental Health Services Act requires the state to
develop an information system to identify patients' participation in the
mental health program. 79 Unlike the predecessor Act, this new section
guarantees the confidentiality of client information. 80 Although statuto-
rily imposed confidentiality does not always create a testimonial privi-
lege, 81 both public policy and statutory interpretation support the conclu-
sion that the new Act extends the psychotherapist-patient privilege to
clinic employees.
1. Public Policy
One important goal of the new Act is to provide access to mental health
services for underserved populations, including "minorities, children,
the elderly, disabled, and low income persons." ' 82 In 1978, at a time
when only 8.6% of the state's population was below the federal poverty
level, 33.4% of the case load in the community mental health centers
consisted of persons below that level. 83 Patients at the clinics are charged
a "sliding scale" fee based on their ability to pay. 84 These clinics can
74. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.24.035(4)(h) (Supp. 1982).
75. Mental Health Program, Budget Proposal Divisions, Bureaus & Regions 2-65 (1981) (copy
on file with the Washington Law Review).
76. Id.
77. Letter from Carol Knobel, Department of Social and Health Services to William Hague
(April 15, 1982) (copy on file with the Washington Law Review). Education of staff members varies
from paraprofessional to M.D.-Psychiatry. Id.
78. Mental Health Program, supra note 75, at 2-65.
79.' WASH. REv. CODE § 71.24.035(4)(h) (Supp. 1982).
80. Id.
81. See infra notes 91-92.
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.015(1) (Supp. 1982).
83. D. Kole, supra note 69, at 8.
84. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.24.215 (Supp. 1982).
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thus be referred to as "the poor man's psychiatrist." 85 Extending the tes-
timonial privilege to these clinics would provide the poor with an oppor-
tunity to have confidentiality when receiving psychotherapeutic treat-
ment.
Although the clinics treat many of the same mental and social disorders
as do psychiatrists and licensed psychologists, 86 very few of the employ-
ees in the clinics are members of either profession. Presently, less than
seven percent of the professionals working in Washington's clinics can
guarantee confidentiality under the physician-patient or psychologist-cli-
ent privileges. 87 Because these clinics provide essentially the same ser-
vices as psychiatrists and licensed psychologists, patients consulting
clinic employees should have the same need for confidentiality as patients
consulting the more expensive professional groups. 88
Extending the privilege to the clinics will not preclude the testimony of
all persons who purport to provide psychotherapeutic services. Rather, it
will limit the privilege to three professional groups over which the state
retains some control. The state, through licensure proceedings, has a
mechanism for supervising the quality of services provided by psychia-
trists, psychologists and employees of the mental health clinics. 89 Mem-
bers of each group could lose their right to practice for inappropriate treat-
ment. The state can provide the privilege to these groups without fear of
abuse. Extending the privilege to the clinics resolves the conflict dis-
cussed in this Comment: it provides low income persons the opportunity
to receive confidential care for mental disorders, and it limits the privilege
to specified professional groups. The courts are not forced to analyze each
case by a vague functional approach, and patients can know, in advance,
whether their conversations are subject to disclosure.
85. Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411,421 (Alaska 1976).
86. See WASH REV CODE § 71.24.015(1) (Supp. 1982), which provides: "It is the intent of the
legislature to establish a community mental health program which provides for ... access to mental
health services for residents of the state who are acutely mentally ill, seriously disturbed or chroni-
cally mentally ill."
In 1979, the community mental health agencies served 68,233 clients, 56% of whom were "seri-
ously disturbed." Mental Health Program, supra note 75, at 2-65.
87. In 1980, of the 1706 employees in the community health centers around the state, only 55
were psychiatrists and 44 were licensed psychologists. Letter from Carol Knobel, Department of
Social and Health Services to William Hague (April 15, 1982) (copy on file with the Washington Law
Review).
88. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
89. See WASH. REV CODE § 18.71.020-.051, .120-.145 (1981) (physicians); WASH. REV CODE
§ 18.83.070-.100 (1981) (psychologists); WASH. REV CODE § 71.24.035(c)(i), .035(4)(i), .220




The recognition of privileged communications with clinic personnel is
further supported by statutory references to the confidentiality of client
information and records in the new Act.90 Although several Washington
cases have held that statutory references to confidentiality do not neces-
sarily prevent a judge from compelling the production of evidence, 91 the
use of the word "confidential" in a statute can convince the court to
adopt a privilege. The resolution of this question requires an examination
of the legislative intent and the application of Wigmore's four canons. 92
Because the clinics treat the same mental and emotional disorders as do
psychiatrists and licensed psychologists, the four canons apply not only to
90. See WASH. REv. CODE § 71.24.035(4)(h) (Supp. 1982), which provides in part: "Confiden-
tiality of client information and records shall be maintained as provided in RCW 71.05.390 ......
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (1981), part of Washington's involuntary civil commitment statute,
provides in part: "The fact of admission and all information and records compiled, obtained, or
maintained in the course of providing services to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services
at public and private agencies shall be confidential."
The statute then lists eight exceptions that are not relevant here and concludes:
The fact of admission, as well as all records, files, evidence, findings, or orders made, pre-
pared, collected, or maintained pursuant to this chapter shall not be admissible as evidence in
any legal proceeding outside [the involuntary civil commitment chapter] without the written
consent of the person who was the subject of the proceeding.
Id.
91. See, for example, State v. Mark, 23 Wn. App. 392, 394-95, 597 P.2d 406, 407-08 (1979),
where the court found that the confidentiality requirements of the Washington Board of Pharmacy did
not create an evidentiary privilege.
92. See State ex rel. Haugland v. Smythe, 25 Wn. 2d 161, 169 P.2d 706 (1946); Mebust v.
Mayco Mfg. Co., 8 Wn. App. 359, 506 P.2d 326 (1973). In Haugland, the court faced the issue of
whether a judge could compel a county welfare department administrator to produce the confidential
file of a delinquent minor child. Although a statute provided safeguards against the disclosure of
information, the court rejected a welfare records privilege because of the absence of two of Wig-
more's four canons. The court held that the confidentiality of the communications must be combined
with Wigmore's four canons to establish a privilege. 25 Wn. 2d at 168, 169 P.2d at 710. See supra
notes 21-32 and accompanying text for the application of Wigmore's conditions to the psychothera-
pist-patient privilege.
In Mebust, the issue was whether "RCW 51.28.070, by making industrial insurance claim files
and records 'confidential,' place[d] them beyond the reach of judicial discovery process." 8 Wn.
App. at 360, 506 P.2d at 326. The court, quoting from State v. Thompson, 54 Wn. 2d 100, 104, 338
P.2d 319, 322 (1959), stated:
It does not necessarily follow from the use of the word "confidential," that it was the legisla-
tive intention that this word have the same import as the word "privileged."
The intention of a lawmaking body to place [a] report in a class which is not subject to judicial
inquiry or process, cannot be determined by the use of the term "confidential" as used in the
cited section in the statute. The legislative intent must be gleaned from an examination of the
enactment in its entirety.
8 Wn. App. at 360-61, 506 P.2d at 327.
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these two professions, but also to the clinic employees. 93 Thus, the legis-
lative intent must be examined to determine whether the use of the term
"confidential" in the new Act creates a statutory privilege.
The legislature intended to help the poor obtain access to mental health
services when it amended the Act.94 This legislative goal can best be ef-
fectuated by extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege to clinic em-
ployees. Confidentiality is essential to assure the best treatment possible.
Any breach of confidentiality would contravene the legislative purpose of
providing mental health services to the poor.
The legislative intent to create a testimonial privilege is buttressed by
the direct reference in the Act to the confidentiality section of the involun-
tary civil commitment statute. 95 That statute provides that "records, files,
evidence, findings or orders made.., pursuant to this [civil commitment]
chapter shall not be admissible in any legal proceeding outside this chap-
ter without the written consent of the person who was the subject of the
proceeding.' '96 By reference, any information received from a client at a
mental health services clinic can be used only in a court proceeding for
involuntary civil commitment. Reference to the involuntary civil commit-
ment statute may not be a precise method for creating a privilege, as the
purposes of that Act vary from the purposes of the Community Mental
Health Services Act. 97 Nonetheless, the mandate for confidentiality found
in the involuntary civil commitment statute, combined with the fulfill-
ment of Wigmore's canons, and with the legislative intent to help the
poor, are probably sufficient to create an evidentiary privilege for com-
munications made to professionals working in the mental health services
clinics.
C. Proposed Uniform Statute for Washington
Extending the privilege to professionals working in the community
mental health clinics resolves, to a large extent, the conflict discussed in
this Comment. It provides confidentiality to the poor who seek treatment
while safeguarding the courts' need for relevant testimony. Nevertheless,
Washington now has three separate privileges that protect confidentiality
93. See supra note 86 for the services performed by the clinics. See supra notes 21-32 and
accompanying text for the application of Wigmore's four conditions to psychotherapists.
94. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 90.
96. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.390 (1981).
97. Both acts were created in order to provide treatment for persons with mental disorders. The
Involuntary Civil Commitment Act goes further in that its main purpose is to end inappropriate and
indefinite commitment of mentally disordered persons and to safeguard individual rights. WASH. REV
CODE § 71.05.010 (1981).
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in a psychotherapeutic setting. Psychiatrists are covered under the physi-
cian-patient privilege, the psychologist-patient privilege refers to the at-
torney-client privilege, and clinic employees may be covered under the
new Act.
Each of these groups provides essentially the same service 98 and confi-
dentiality is essential to treatment in all three settings. 99 Granting separate
privileges to each group serves no beneficial purpose, and it creates the
potential for confusing and inconsistent results. Although the current stat-
utory structure should provide the same degree of confidentiality, there is
no guarantee of consistency when separate statutes are applied to each
relationship. For example, the psychologist-patient privilege arguably ex-
tends to situations where the patient reasonably believes his therapist is a
licensed psychologist. 100 On the other hand, this "reasonable belief" ex-
tension would not apply to psychiatrists as their privilege is based upon
the physician-patient privilege, not the attorney-client privilege. Wig-
more notes that the physican must be a professional and provides no rea-
sonable belief exception. 101 Thus, communications by a patient who rea-
sonably believed that his therapist was a psychologist may be privileged,
but statements by a patient who believed his therapist was a psychiatrist
would not. Further, the privilege for clinic employees, as set forth in this
Comment, is based largely on the confidentiality section of the involun-
tary civil commitment statute. That section is subject to a series of excep-
tions that are not applicable to the other two privileges. 102
Providing one statute for all three privileges would eliminate the poten-
tial for disparate results. In order to establish a uniform application of the
privilege to psychotherapeutic communications, several states have en-
98. See supra note 86.
99. See supra notes 24-26.
100. The Washington Supreme Court discussed this possibility in State v. Fagalde, 85 Wn. 2d
730, 539 P.2d 86 (1976). Because that privilege is equated with the attorney-client privilege, it could
be extended based on a patient's belief in the status of his psychologist. The Fagalde court, in a
footnote, referred to 8 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2302 (1961). 85 Wn. 2d at 737 n.2, 539 P.2d at 91
n.2. The cited section of WIGMORE states:
The theory of the privilege... clearly requires that the client's bona fide belief in the status of
his adviser as an admitted attorney should entitle him to the privilege. No doubt an intention to
employ only such a person is necessary, as well as a respectable degree of precaution in seeking
one. But from that point onward he is entitled to peace of mind and need not take the risk of a
deception or of a defective professional title.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2302.
Under this theory, if patients reasonably believe their psychotherapists are licensed psychologists,
they could claim the privilege.
101. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 6, § 2382.
102. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.390(1981).
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acted general psychotherapist-patient privileges. 10 3 These statutes expand
or contract the scope of the privilege by their definition of "psychothera-
pists." Many states limit the privilege to psychiatrists and licensed psy-
chologists, 104 while others are more expansive. 105 The Washington legis-
lature could avoid disparity among the privileges for its three protected
groups, psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, and clinic employees, by
103. See supra notes 61 & 62. Several of these statutes are based on the Proposed Rule 504,
supra note 13, which provides:
RULE 504. PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
(a) Definitions.
(I) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state or na-
tion, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment
of a mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, or (B) a person licensed or certi-
fied as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation while similarly engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation, examination, or inter-
view, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons
who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist.
including members of the patient's family.
(b) General Rule of Privilege.
A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing
confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or
emotional conditions including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons
who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist,
including members of the patient's family.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege.
The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by his guardian or conservator, or by the per-
sonal representative of a deceased patient. The person who was the psychotherapist may claim
the privilege but only on behalf of the patient. His authority so to do is presumed in the absence
of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedings for Hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications
relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the psychother-
apist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient is in need of hospital-
ization.
(2) Examination by Order of Judge. If the judge orders an examination of the mental or emo-
tional condition of the patient, communications made in the course thereof are not privileged
under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination is ordered unless
the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an Element of Claim or Defense. There is no privilege under this rule as to
communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense, or, after
the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the condition as an element
of his claim or defense.
See Proposed Rule 504, supra note 13, at 240-41. The proposed federal rule may be unnecessarily
long. At any rate, it is inadequate because it does not provide the poor with access to confidentiality.
104. See, for example, the text of Proposed Rule 504, supra note 103.
105. See, for example, CAL EVID. CODE § 1010 (West Supp. 1983), which includes clinical
social workers, school psychologists and marriage counselors within the definition of psychothera-
pist.
Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
adopting a uniform statute. A proposed statute, based on Proposed Rule
504, 106 is set forth below:
The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege
a. A psychotherapist shall not, without the consent of his patient, be ex-
amined as to any confidential communication made by the patient to the
psychotherapist for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
mental or emotional condition. This privilege extends to all persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the psy-
chotherapist. Provided, this privilege shall not apply in any judicial pro-
ceeding involving child abuse under RCW Ch. 26.44, nor any involuntary
civil commitment proceeding under RCW Ch. 71.05. Nor shall this privi-
lege apply to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emo-
tional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which the patient relies
upon the condition as an element of his claim or defense.
b. A psychotherapist is (i) a person authorized to practice medicine in any
state while engaged in the diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional
condition, (ii) a person licensed or certified as a psychologist under RCW
Ch. 18.83, while similarly engaged, or (iii) an employee of an agency which
is a licensed service provider according to RCW Ch. 71.24, also while simi-
larly engaged.
The proposed statute has several advantages not found in the present
system. First, recognizing that there are basic differences between psy-
chotherapist-patient relationships and those of attorney-client or physi-
cian-patient, this uniform statute does not refer to those privileges in de-
fining its scope. Second, consistent with this Comment, the statute
provides the poor with access to confidential communications in psy-
chotherapy by including clinic employees within the privilege. 107 It also
protects the courts' need for relevant evidence by limiting the privilege to
specific professional groups. Third, the three current exemptions from the
privilege, child abuse, involuntary civil commitment, and patient-liti-
gant, are identified in the statute. Last, the statute is a uniform and com-
prehensive privilege that provides the same degree of confidentiality in
various psychotherapeutic settings.
CONCLUSION
The legislature has accepted the validity of the psychotherapist-patient
106. See the text of Proposed Rule 504, supra note 103.
107. This Comment argues that the new Community Mental Health Services Act protects confi-
dential communications by creating a privilege for clinic employees. See supra notes 68-97 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Act is susceptible to a contrary interpretation by the courts.
The interests of the poor would be better served if the privilege were clearly delineated in a statute
that codified all the psychotherapist-patient privileges together.
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privilege by creating a privilege for psychiatrists and psychologists and
their patients. By limiting the privilege to psychiatrists and licensed psy-
chologists, however, Washington has in the past prevented the poor from
having access to confidential communications with psychotherapists. The
new Community Mental Health Services Act appears to have created an
evidentiary privilege for the mental health services clinics. These clinics
were created to meet the special needs of low income persons. This exten-
sion serves two purposes: (1) it protects the courts' interest in obtaining
evidence by clearly delineating the number of groups the psychotherapist-
patient privilege covers, and (2) it provides the poor with confidentiality
in psychotherapy. While the legislature has provided for a resolution to
the difficulty in the privilege's scope, it has done so in a disjointed fash-
ion by creating three separate privileges for the three groups of mental
health care providers. This should be resolved by adopting a comprehen-
sive statute that applies equally to all three groups.
William Whitmore Hague
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